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REGIONAL PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BRICOLAGE  
 




Entrepreneurial development of contaminated or blighted land, commonly referred 
to as “brownfield,” carries significant enterprise risk.  When considering competing 
opportunities, capital tends to flow in an adverse direction from higher-risk activity 
where outcomes are less certain.  In addition, a complicated regulatory landscape 
can increase transaction costs which further limit the desirability of these projects.  
Often, that leaves the remediation of environmentally compromised property in the 
hands of the public sector.  Yet, in industrialized nations with significant brownfield 
presence, government is often unable to solely cure defects due to limited fiscal 
resources and competing policy imperatives.  One solution to the problem is to 
employ a public/private redevelopment partnership along with corollary legal 
remedies to incentivize brownfield redevelopment, minimize transaction costs, and 
limit enterprise risk exposure. 
 
KEY WORDS:  Brownfield, Urban Revitalization, Entrepreneurship, Chelsea 
Massachusetts, Marseille France, Euroméditerranée, Regional Development. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The nature of entrepreneurial ventures involves a substantial amount of risk 
taking on the part of any potential venture developer.  This is particularly true in 
the context of capital-intensive land development that requires the commitment of 
significant financial resources from an entrepreneur.  Land is, by definition, a finite 
economic resource “subject to competing pressures from urbanization, 
infrastructure, increased food, feed, fibre and fuel production and the provision of 
key ecosystem services.”1  Often, land acquisition and related transaction costs are 
a substantial barrier to the financing and success of a venture, especially when soil 
contamination might be a possibility. The presence of environmentally 
contaminated and compromised land, particularly in urban areas, can have a 
dilatory effect on moving regional economic development and revitalization efforts 
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forward. These in turn can have a number of negative socio-economic impacts. 
Blighted land negatively impacts property values and disincentivizes investment in 
often already depressed neighborhoods and communities. It adds to social 
problems, discourages renovation and maintenance of existing properties, and leads 
to further deterioration and decay.  Remediation costs can be difficult to assess or 
quantify for the redevelopment of environmentally compromised, or “brownfield,” 
sites.  In regimes that assess liability for land pollution to any and all owners who 
fall within the chain of responsibility for a given property, the mechanisms for 
guarding against liability exposure are limited, and the economic and legal risks 
associated with that development are often a high bar to a project moving forward. 
Accordingly, capital often seeks less risk-loaded investments with a higher 
likelihood of successful returns, leaving brownfield sites as a less attractive 
investment relative to investments with lower barriers to entry. 
The purpose of this article is to suggest policy schemes that might reduce 
transaction costs for and minimize enterprise risk associated with brownfield 
redevelopment projects through (1) the use of a public/private partnership to 
acquire and remediate contaminated properties and (2) the adoption of regulatory 
and policy frameworks for assessing and apportioning liability for environmental 
damages that reward participation in same. First, it offers a brief discussion of 
socio-economic impacts stemming from environmentally contaminated land. It 
then makes the case for considering land development an entrepreneurial activity 
and discusses some basic tenets of entrepreneurship. Next, it defines the term 
brownfield and discusses considerations associated with the redevelopment of 
environmentally contaminated land. Further, it provides a context for considering 
the economic, social, and political rationales for incentivizing private sector 
remediation of those sites. Then, it considers differences in the regulatory schemes 
governing remediation of environmentally contaminated land of the United States 
and the European Union (E.U.), with particular attention paid to the frameworks of 
several E.U. member states. In addition, it advances an emerging argument for 
incentivizing redevelopment of brownfield sites through legal policy frameworks 
encouraging public/private partnerships to prompt action and the encouragement of 
covenants not to sue and other legal remedies to minimize enterprise risk. Finally, 
it discusses two innovative regional public/private partnerships – one from Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, and the other from Marseille, France, and explores whether the use 
of similar vehicles to spur entrepreneurial economic development of brownfield 
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY CONTAMINATED LAND 
AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF A SOLELY PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE 
The presence of environmentally compromised land has a negative effect 
on regional quality of life, property values, and economic development.2  It has 
severe repercussions across communities.  Studies have estimated that public 
disclosure of brownfield property on a register or database has a significant impact 
on private investment within a region.3  Brownfields have social, economic, and 
health consequences. 
In the absence of firms taking responsibility for the externalities created by 
their profit-seeking activity, government has a responsibility to act on behalf of 
regional communities to minimize negative consequences associated with those 
activities.  One way of framing this imperative is to consider the broken windows 
metaphor4 developed to support community policing.  In that theoretical 
framework, physical disorder emanating from vacant buildings, broken windows, 
accumulated debris, graffiti, and blight, etc. leads to more significant social harms 
in the form of social disorder and higher crime rates.  In that formula, government 
has a responsibility to act aggressively to limit the impacts ‘broken windows’ can 
have on communities.5  Applied in the context of regional economic development, 
the presence of broken windows and other indicators of blight and decay on 
neighborhood properties reduces incentives for investment by the private sector and 
increases risk and transaction costs among those who might invest.  Lack of 
remediation of these sites results in two major problems.  First, limited tax revenue 
derived from these sites impacts the ability of government to provide and fund 
essential services and leads to higher levels of inequity imposed on the remaining 
tax base.  Second, lack of remediation drives down the economic value of 
contiguous properties.  Those properties that become marginal operations due to 
the negative impacts associated with blighted property are more likely to decline in 
value.  The cumulative effect of these conditions is an overall negative trend in the 
economic health of a region and a shrinking tax base.  Therefore, the public sector 
has both a moral duty and an economic incentive to act on behalf of the region to 
                                                 
2 Christopher A. De Sousa, Changshan Wu, and Lynne M. Westphal. Assessing the Effect of 
Publicly Assisted Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Property Values.  ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY, 23:2, 95-110. (2009). 
3 H.C. Jenkins-Smith, C.L. Silva, R.P. Berrens, and A. Bohara.  Information Disclosure 
Requirements and the Effect of Soil Contamination on Property Values. JOURNAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. 45:3, 323-339. (2002).   
4 J.Q. Wilson, & G. Kelling. The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows. ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY. 127, 29-38. (1982).   
5 Id. 
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maximize economic value and foster conditions for economic development. 
However, the costs of remediating brownfield property and other urban 
blight are simply too large for public sector resolution alone.  In a 2004 study, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the cost to clean up brownfield 
sites to be upward of $209 Billion.6  Given the number of competing policy 
obligations that governments need to address, it is unlikely that governments will 
be able to solely bear the economic cost of that activity.  In addition, the presence 
of competing private rights of property and interests associated with the public good 
make a defining line as to who bears responsibility to act hard to locate.  
If, then, the public sector cannot do it alone, should the problem be left for 
the private sector to address? That response is equally unsatisfactory.  In a free 
market system, private capital does not have a responsibility to invest in correcting 
negative economic and social effects resulting from activity it does not have a 
causal relationship with.  Private investment is often difficult to attract in 
communities where blighted property exists.  To encourage and attract private 
capital to invest in ‘social goods,’ government needs to create incentives for that 
investment.  However, given the nature of land development as a speculative and 
entrepreneurial venture the typical model of tax abatement/exemption strategies, 
grants, and government backed loans employed to attract private sector investment 
in regional economic development is often insufficient to spur that investment.  
That is largely due to the nature of how land entrepreneurs acquire and deploy 
capital. 
 
B. THE CASE FOR CONSIDERING LAND DEVELOPMENT AS ENTREPRENEURIAL 
ACTIVITY 
Land is a generally finite economic asset subject to competing uses with a 
limited supply constrained by geographic, economic, and political factors.7  
Redevelopment of land in urban areas is fraught with significant amounts of 
economic risk as, unlike other forms of economic activity, land development is 
acutely impacted by the condition of other investments in close geographic 
proximity.8 Just as neglecting broken windows impacts a neighborhood and fosters 
negative spillover effects, failing to clean up blighted property can have similar 
                                                 
6 United States Environmental Protection Agency. CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES: 
MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS. (2004). 
 
7 Klaus Hubacek and Jeroen van den Bergh. Changing Concepts of 'Land' in Economic Theory: 
From Single to Multi-disciplinary Approaches.  ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS. 56:1, 5-27.  (2006).   
8 Richard B. Peiser. Risk Analysis in Land Development. REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS 12, 12–29. 
(1984). 
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results. 
The development of any parcel of land involves the assumption of a high 
degree of risk relating to the allocation and deployment of significant capital assets 
to an activity that is long-term and largely difficult to reverse.  Once you build 
something, you cannot simply unbuild it. This type of activity is often undertaken 
by an actor who (1) engages in projects involving risk where the outcome is 
uncertain; (2) assumes the risk associated with that uncertainty; (3) supplies 
financial capital; (4) allocates resources among alternative uses; and, (5) is an alert 
discoverer or seeker of opportunities.  All of these attributes apply to land investors, 
and all fit classical definitions of entrepreneurship.9  By definition, then, any 
investor in land development is an entrepreneur. 
Regardless of industry, entrepreneurs must engage in a process of analyzing 
any given opportunity through a lens that assesses anticipated costs, anticipated 
risks, and the likelihood of achievement of anticipated outcomes.  All of the above 
assumes the creation of a product that has a quantifiable value and serves a 
particular and identifiable market need.  Entrepreneurs must consider the likelihood 
of receiving an acceptable return on a given investment, and they must weigh the 
attractiveness of one decision opportunity relative to other decision opportunities.  
In doing so, one question an entrepreneur should ask is whether, when measured 
against other possible alternative uses for limited resources, an opportunity has a 
reasonable likelihood of success. 
When conducting that assessment, one important consideration for an 
entrepreneur is the assessment of any given risks associated with a proposed 
activity.  Land speculation is inherently risky, and all property development is on 
some level speculative.  This is due to factors such as the long-term nature of land 
speculation, the requirement to allocate and commit significant amounts of capital 
to that activity for an extended period of time, and the uncertainty associated with 
economic valuation of any land development given a host of uncontrollable external 
factors.  Developers frequently hedge against risk through a variety of mechanisms 
including insurance, leverage, and syndication or joint venture. Indeed, employing 
those strategies in the creation of a profit-seeking new venture might trigger 
fiduciary responsibility on the part of a developer toward partners and other 
investors.  That developer might, for example, be obliged to seek the most 
reasonable return on investment when considering risk, likelihood of success, and 
time to recover investment as some of the primary considerations, which would 
make higher-risk projects less attractive. In any speculative land investment, there 
is generally an element of bricolage – recombining resources at hand or easily 
                                                 
9 For a deeper discussion of these attributes, see Paul Westhead and Mike Wright. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION. Oxford University Press. (2013). 
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acquirable to accomplish a particular goal – and the above hedging strategies are 
classic examples of bricolage.  Bricolage is also a hallmark of entrepreneurship. 
 
C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BROWNFIELD LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In the United States, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA," often referred to as the 
Superfund statute) imposes a strict, joint, and several liability regime at the federal 
level on a responsible party for environmental contamination. CERCLA was 
enacted as a mechanism for locating and recovering costs associated with 
remediating land contamination to facilitate the remediation and reuse of under-
deployed and undervalued economic assets.  As land is finite, and environmentally 
compromised land is often an unusable asset that has negative spillover effects on 
a community or regional level, there is a strong public policy argument for the 
creation of policy mechanisms to encourage remediation and reuse of that property 
in a way that maximizes value and utility. The act allows for the retroactive 
application of liability against any party in the chain of responsibility for 
contamination with a limited array of available defenses.10  CERCLA applies both 
to properties deemed as “superfund” sites and to those defined as brownfields. To 
be deemed a superfund site, a property must be determined to have been 
contaminated by hazardous waste and identified by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) as a candidate for cleanup because it 
poses a risk to human health and/or the environment. After classification, the site 
is placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List (“NPL”).11  Although not every 
environmentally compromised site is classified as a superfund site, there are 1,852 
properties currently on the NPL.12 However, CERCLA has a broader mandate than 
solely applying to superfund sites and imposes significant legal liability for the 
remediation of a broader group of environmentally compromised land commonly 
described as brownfields. 
The term “brownfield” was originally a colloquialism coined to describe 
previously developed land that was environmentally distressed and was contrasted 
with “greenfield,” a land parcel free from environmental contamination that has not 
been built upon. The EPA has since codified a definition of brownfield as “property, 
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the 
                                                 
10  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9675 (2000). 
11 Environmental Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-
priorities-list-npl. 
12 To search properties where you live, see http://www.epa.gov/superfund/search-superfund-
sites-where-you-live.   
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presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant.”13  The E.U. has no formal definition of brownfield.  However, a 
commonly used definition in Europe notes that brownfields are “sites that have 
been affected by the former uses of the site and surrounding land; are derelict and 
underused; may have real or perceived contamination problems; are mainly in 
developed urban areas; and require intervention to bring them back to beneficial 
use.”14 In a French context, brownfield sites are referred to as friches industrielles 
– literally translated as “industrial wasteland.” 
Characteristics common to all definitions include a notion that brownfield 
properties are likely to contain negative environmental risks associated with prior 
industrial or commercial uses. Because the nature of land tenure involves 
successive ownership of property over long periods of time, and the nature of 
pollution often makes locating responsibility for contamination difficult, 
jurisdictions have historically taken fragmented approaches to allocating 
responsibility for environmental harms. The United States employs a broad policy 
framework that casts a wide liability net, while in the European context, the trend 
has been toward narrowing responsibility and following a ‘polluter pays’ approach. 
CERCLA liability supersedes state and local legal frameworks and allows 
for the application of retroactive liability for costs associated with environmental 
contamination or improper remediation of properties deemed to be “superfund” or 
brownfield sites. As a result, CERCLA exposure often serves as a disincentive for 
private sector entrepreneurial development of environmentally compromised land 
as the assessment of financial risk is often difficult to quantify or, in fact, is largely 
unquantifiable.  When an entrepreneur interested in land speculation considers the 
enterprise risk associated with remediating a brownfield site, other less risky 
alternatives comparatively look more attractive, particularly if time horizons for the 
reasonable recovery of capital investments and/or fiduciary responsibilities are a 
consideration.15 As a result of entrepreneurs “passing” on risk-heavy brownfield 
redevelopment opportunities given liability risks associated with that development, 
despite the nearly four decades of the law’s existence, the number of superfund sites 
in the United States is still quite large, and the number of brownfield sites even 
larger. The EPA estimates that there are more than 450,000 brownfield sites in the 
                                                 
13  Environmental Protection Agency. OVERVIEW OF THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM.  
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program.  
14  World Bank. THE MANAGEMENT OF BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: A GUIDANCE NOTE. 
(2010). 
15 A. Alberini, A. Longo, S. Tonin, F. Trombetta, M. Turvani, The Role of Liability, Regulation 
and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of 
Developers. REG SCI URBAN ECON 35:327–351. (2005).  
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United States.16  
In an effort to spur redevelopment of brownfield sites, Congress modified 
CERCLA in 2002 by enacting the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act (commonly referred to as the Brownfields Act).17 Among other 
things, the modification created narrow classes of liability exemption and provided 
some incentives to foster revitalization of brownfield sites.  However, the results 
have been mixed.18 
Legal constructs addressing the remediation and redevelopment of 
environmentally compromised land are significantly different in the European 
context, where the E.U. has yet to adopt a controlling international standard among 
member states.  The primary vehicle for addressing liability for environmentally 
contaminated land in the E.U. is found in Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental 
Liability (“ELD”), which applies a “polluter pays” standard of liability to an 
operator.19  Further, ELD limits that liability solely to activities within the control 
of an operator and does not apply retroactive liability.20 With the exception of the 
ELD (which sets forth a broad policy mandate while allowing for different policy 
schema amongst the member states), the E.U. does not have a broad policy 
framework. 
To avoid some of the remediation and redevelopment disincentives that 
flow from the CERCLA statute, a number of European governments have enacted 
legislative frameworks that restrict liability and/or provide incentives for 
remediation of environmentally compromised soil.21  The legislative frameworks 
generally fall into two distinct categories: those jurisdictions that impose retroactive 
                                                 
16 Environmental Protection Agency. OVERVIEW OF THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM.  
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program.    
17 Pub. L. No. 107-118, Stat. 2306 (2002).  
18 For an interesting review of the Brownfields Act, see Flannary P. Collins, The Small Business 
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 303, 
328 (2003). 
19 As defined in the ELD, an operator is defined as “any natural or legal, private or public person 
who operates or controls the occupational activity or…to whom decisive economic power over 
the…activity has been delegated.” ELD, Article II, §6. 
20 The preamble to the ELD states: “According to the ‘polluter pays’ principle, an operator 
causing environmental damage or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, in principle, 
bear the cost of the necessary preventative or remedial measures…” (ELD, at 18.)  It goes on to state 
that “an operator should not be required to bear the costs of preventive or remedial actions taken 
pursuant to this Directive in situations where the damage in question or imminent threat thereof is 
the result of certain events beyond the operator’s control.” (Id. at 20). 
21 Anna Alberini, Alberto Longo, Stefania Tonin, Francesco Trombetta, Margherita Turvani, 
The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and 
Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers, REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN 
ECONOMICS.  35:4, 327-351. (2005).   
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liability similar to the superfund framework, and those that adopt a “polluter-pays” 
approach more in keeping with civil law traditions and the European Union’s policy 
guidance. Many of the “polluter-pays” policy frameworks locate responsibility for 
environmental cleanup to a sub-national or regional level, and most provide a 
system of voluntary agreements and initiatives.22  
In France, management of brownfield or contaminated sites is a regional 
activity, and there is no retroactive liability imposed on an entity that acquires a 
brownfield site that had no relationship with the prior use.23  Accordingly, cleanup 
costs are difficult to allocate to responsible parties and are often borne by a 
combination of government and interested private developer.24 
 
D. AN ARGUMENT FOR INCENTIVIZING PRIVATE SECTOR REDEVELOPMENT OF 
BROWNFIELD SITES THROUGH LEGAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
As stated above, government alone cannot solve the problem of remediating 
and redeveloping environmentally contaminated sites.  The transaction costs 
associated with that remediation are too substantial for government to absorb given 
a host of competing policy imperatives.  However, statutory frameworks that 
impose liability to on any responsible party for damages associated with owning, 
using, or remediating brownfield sites with extremely narrow and limited 
exceptions, serve as an effective deterrent for entrepreneurial activity in that sector, 
harming everyone.  While property acquisition values for brownfield property 
might be lower than comparably situated greenfield property given the significant 
costs associated with redevelopment, the economic risks associated with 
remediation are often too great to justify investment.  A form of “Handyman’s 
special” logic does not apply, and the result is an oversupply of blighted properties 
in a market with no interested buyers. 
Under a polluter pays framework as employed in the ELD and in the French 
context, liability for environmental remediation is limited to those activities solely 
under the control of an operator, is proportional, and is not retroactive. As a result, 
the enterprise risk calculation is different, but the acquisition and remediation costs 
to develop a brownfield property might be a bar when projects are considered 
relative to greenfield development. Similarly, in the United States, the CERCLA 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Gareth Thornton, Martin Franz, David Edwards, Gernot Pahlen, Paul Nathanail, The 
Challenge of Sustainability: Incentives for Brownfield Regeneration in Europe. ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCE & POLICY. 10:2, 116-134. (2007).   
24 Lauren Andres, Levels of Governance and Multi-stage Policy Process of Brownfield 
Regeneration: A Comparison of France and Switzerland.  INTERNATIONAL PLANNING STUDIES. 
17:1, 23-43. (2012). 
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statute extends liability protection to five types of parties engaged in the acquisition 
and remediation of a brownfield site, provided that they comply with a specific set 
of regulatory requirements under CERCLA §101(40)(C-G) and §107(q).25 
Arguably, in the U.S. context, the limited nature of those exceptions does not 
encourage private purchase and redevelopment of a brownfield site unless the 
economic costs and associated risks are quantifiable and manageable.  Indeed, one 
important consideration in that analysis is that while an innocent purchaser of a 
brownfield site might be exempt from CERCLA liability, he will not be exempt 
from the remediation costs associated with that property as CERCLA contains 
windfall recovery provisions.26 
One method of managing such associated risks in a non-polluter pays 
jurisdiction is for a private entity interested in developing a brownfield property to 
(1) purchase that property after it has been remediated by an intermediate party who 
agrees to assume the risk of remediation and become part of the chain of 
responsibility and (2) do so after the issuance of covenants not to file suit and seek 
damages for environmental problems from appropriate agencies at the sub-national 
and national levels.   
In the French context, the analysis of enterprise risk with regard to 
brownfield liability is different given the statutory regime used to allocate 
responsibility, but the economic calculus is similar – capital seeks similar return 
conversant with lower risk, and the economic cost of remediation is a significant 
bar to investment. 
Accordingly, the use of a properly structured public/private partnership or 
other intermediary agency to acquire and remediate contaminated brownfield sites 
may be an effective way to reduce transaction costs and spur regional economic 
development in both regulatory schemes.  One successful example of such a 
partnership in the United States is the redevelopment of the Box District in Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, and another is the Euroméditerranée project established in Marseille 
in 1995.27  Both are models for how to effect brownfield redevelopment and spur 
                                                 
25 The five types of parties include:  
• Innocent landowners, CERCLA §101(35)(A).  
• Contiguous property owners, §107(q).  
• Bona fide prospective purchasers, §§ 101(40) and 107(r).  
• Units of state or local government that acquire ownership or control involuntarily through 
bankruptcy, tax delinquency or abandonment, §101(20)(D).  
• Government entities that acquire property through eminent domain, §101(35)(A)(ii). 
26 For a broader discussion of this issue, see BROWNFIELDS, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd S. Davis & Scott A. Sherman, eds., 3d. ed. 2010).  
27 For a comparative analysis of the two projects, see J. F. McArdle, (2018). 3P PARTNERSHIPS 
AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRANSFORMATION.  Manuscript in preparation.   
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regional economic and social gains. 
 
III. TWO SUCCESSFUL MODELS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE 
REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELD SITES.  
A. THE BOX DISTRICT. CHELSEA, MASSACHUSETTS 
   Chelsea, Massachusetts, is a working class suburban gateway community 
north of Boston. For most of the 20th Century, Chelsea had been the home to 
numerous manufacturing and shipping companies.  Many of these companies were 
centered in any area of Chelsea known as the box district – largely comprised of 
mattress and cardboard box manufacturing facilities. 
   The box district is a 10.5 acre parcel of land that has been extensively 
redeveloped as a result of a three-party, public-private partnership between the city 
of Chelsea, a local non-profit developer, and a for-profit land development 
company.  Redevelopment of the site has resulted in 248 mixed-income housing 
units, a multi-modal public transit stop, and a million dollar public access park.  The 
entire project was valued at over $70 million and took approximately 10 years to 
complete.28 
Development of the site occurred after the property languished for years. 
There was a lack of interest on the part of private development companies to 
speculatively engage in site remediation and investment to produce housing units 
that might not be profitable. In 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
modified zoning laws to incentivize development of mixed income housing units 
under a program known as 40R.  The 40R program was intended to encourage 
adaptive reuse of development sites to create affordable housing in transit-rich 
neighborhoods.  Working with a local nonprofit redevelopment agency, the city of 
Chelsea was able to attract private development of the site through a mix of 
streamlined financing and acquisition strategies of properties within the zone, as 
well as fast-tracked building regulations and approvals.  Local control of zoning 
regulations and strong working relationships between city, state, and federal 
officials allowed for clearance of many of the administrative hurdles that typically 
preclude private developers from engaging in complicated brownfield 
redevelopment projects.  
Employing the above approach housed within a public-private partnership, 
reduced the enterprise risk often associated with projects of this type and allowed 
for a private developer to commit resources that otherwise might have been 
                                                 
28 For greater detail, see Archana Pyati. CHELSEA’S BOX DISTRICT DEMONSTRATES THE POWER OF 
HIGH-QUALITY AFFORDABLE HOUSING TO ATTRACT MARKET-RATE DEVELOPMENT.  Urban Land 
Institute. (2016).  
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deployed elsewhere.  The partnership was able to leverage a significant amount of 
federal and state grant monies to clear the financial barriers to entry that otherwise 
exist for a private developer.  By further negotiating the development of an 
intermodal transportation hub within the development, the partnership was able to 
create regional neighborhood conditions that made the site much more attractive 
for residential use.  The project has also resulted in spillover effects in the local 
community, including coordination with a number of workforce and community 
development organizations that have been able to achieve strong economies of scale 
to strengthen the community. 
 
B. EUROMÉDITERRANÉE.  MARSEILLE, FRANCE. 
     At 480 hectares (1186 acres), the project covers almost 75% of the total 
area of the city of Marseille. It is the largest urban redevelopment project in 
southern Europe. While significantly larger in scale than the Box District project, 
Euroméditerranée shares some similar characteristics with its American 
counterpart. 
The project began in 1995 as a partnership between the French national 
government and several regional governments to renovate a blighted urban district 
between the historic port, the commercial harbor, and the TGV rail station.  
Marseille is a gateway city for immigration into southern Europe, and the district 
had historically been seen as crime-ridden and rife with a number of social issues.  
With over two decades of history, Euroméditerranée is an unparalleled 
success. The project has impacted 40,000 residents and created 35,000 jobs.  A 7.5 
billion euro investment has resulted in 1 million m2 of office space, 24,000 housing 
units, and 200,000 m2 of public facilities.  Those facilities include 150 acres of parks 
and public spaces as well as 3 miles of waterfront promenade.  Every euro of public 
investment has been matched by 5 euros of direct private investment.29 Rather than 
working with an individual private development partner, Euroméditerranée has 
been successful by employing a strategy of acquiring, remediating, and transferring 
clean brownfield land post-remediation to private developers. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Both of the above examples are successful models of public/private 
brownfield redevelopment partnerships able to limit developer liability, incentivize 
private investment in adapting brownfield sites, and reduce transaction costs 
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associated with site redevelopment.  This type of approach works in multiple policy 
regimes, can be deployed at various points of scale, and allows both the public and 
private sectors to employ leverage that amplifies the impact of their investments. 
As regions weigh the question of what to do with blighted properties within 
their borders, they would do well to consider the formation of public/private land 
redevelopment partnerships as a vehicle for success. 
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